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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CALVIN LEE NIXON,
Petitioner/Appellant,
-vs-

Appellate Case No. 20071004

STATE OF UTAH,

Lower Court No. 070903073

Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

COMES NOW Appellant, Calvin Lee Nixon, Jr. (hereafter "Nixon"), by and
through counsel, Mary C. Corporon, and submits the following Brief:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Rules 3 & 4 and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f)(2001).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following are the issues presented on appeal:
1.

Issue: Did the trial court err in granting the State's Motion to Dismiss
Appellant's Petition for post-conviction relief as barred by the statute of
limitations?
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Standard of review: The standard of review for the trial court's dismissal of
Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief is reviewed for correctness, under a de
novo standard. See Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, fl 8.
2.

Issue: Did the trial court err in its findings that the "interests of justice"
exception to the statute of limitations for a petition for post-conviction
relief, did not apply?

Standard of Review:

The standard of review for a challenge of the trial

court's findings that the "interests of justice" exception to the statute of limitations for
post-conviction relief is one of correctness, with a de novo review. See, Adams v.
State, 2005 UT App. 62, p .
3.

Issue: Did the trial court err by finding that Appellant failed to allege
sufficient facts to support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?

Standard of Review: The standard of review of a trial court's factual findings
regarding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is reviewed for clear error, and
the trial court's application of law to the facts is reviewed for correctness. See,
Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, fl9.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS / STATUTES AND RULES
There is no case law nor statutory authority believed by Appellant to be wholly
dispositive of the issues raised on appeal. However, Utah Code Ann. §78-35a, et
seq is relevant to the proceeding.

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is about injustice - the injustice to Nixon when his petition for postconviction relief was dismissed by the trial court. This case is also about the interest
of justice: how the interests of justice have been denied, due to the trial court's
dismissal of Appellant's post-conviction relief petition. This case is also about due
process, or whether Nixon's constitutional rights were denied due to the trial court's
dismissal of his petition. (Acopy of the Order Granting the State's Motion to Dismiss
is attached as Addendum 1).
The trial court in this matter erred in dismissing Appellant's petition for postconviction relief. The actions and non-actions of Nixon's counsel at the time he
entered a plea of guilty meet the definition of ineffective counsel, provided by case
law and the laws of this state. The trial court erred in failing to make a finding
supporting Nixon's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, despite his counsel
having been convicted of using drugs, and despite his being disbarred on the heels
of Nixon's negotiated plea, as well as his failure to consider Nixon's potential
defense of self-defense.
Nixon was, until this month, held in the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah. On
August 31, 2004, Appellant plead guilty to a third degree felony aggravated assault
in the State of Utah, Second District, Case no. 041901203, and was sentenced to
an indeterminate term, not to exceed five years, in the Utah State Prison. Nixon
agreed to the plea bargain offered by the State, based upon the advice of his then-3-

counsel, Geoffrey L. Clark ("Clark"). Another attorney, Christopher Greenwood, also
represented Nixon, but in a more limited role than Clark.
On May 11, 2007, Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, previously
filed in the Third Judicial District Court was transferred and filed with the Second
Judicial District Court (R.003). The State of Utah moved to dismiss the Petition,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 65(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the 17th
day of July 2007 (R.031 -135). Nixon then filed a response to the motion on the 14th
day of September 2007 (R.143-148). The State filed a reply (R.152-161).

Nixon

filed a request for hearing on October 26, 2007 (R.170-171). The trial court then,
after consideration of the petition, motions, and memorandums filed by both parties,
granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition (R. 162-169). The trial court did not
grant a hearing.
The resulting order dismissing Nixon's petition was entered on the 22nd day
of October 2007 (R.162-169). A Notice of Appeal was filed on the 21 s t day of
November 2007(R.172).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant, Calvin Lee Nixon, Jr., is currently on parole from the Utah State
Prison. On August 31,2004, Nixon plead guilty to a third degree felony, aggravated
assault, in the State of Utah, Second District Court, Case No. 041901203, and was
sentenced to an indeterminate term, not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison (R.92). Appellant agreed to this plea bargain offered by the State, based
-4-

upon the advice of his then-counsel, Geoffrey L. Clark ("Clark").
Appellant's plea agreement and current prison sentence is a result of Clark's
ineffective assistance of counsel (R.004). Particularly, Clark never talked to the
Appellant about a self-defense claim and never answered his telephone calls
(R.004). Despite being paid $30,000.00, Clark only saw the Appellant three times
in six months. Furthermore, Clark, at the time of the Appellant's decision to plead,
at the time of the change of plea, and at sentencing was high on illegal drugs
(R.004). He has since plead guilty to two counts of third degree felony, including
attempt to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a controlled
substance (Case No. 041906423, in the Second District Court, Weber County)
(R.126-135) and has been disbarred (R.004).
Clark was charged with two counts of third degree felony for the distribution
and possession of a controlled substance on or around November 24,2004 (R. 126).
On or around June 30, 2005, Clark plead guilty to two third degree felonies (R. 126135).

Appellant found out about Clark's sentencing, and reasonably obtained

counsel to file the necessary motions for relief.
Nixon's petition for post-conviction relief centers on his claim that his thencounsel, Clark, was ineffective. This is founded upon the subsequent knowledge
Nixon discovered in 2006, concerning Clark's drug use and abuse. Clark was
disbarred by the Utah State Bar, due to his alcohol and drug abuse and admissions
that he was utilizing drugs when he was in court and advising his clients (Addendum
-5-

2). Clark was charged with two counts of third degree felonies on June 30, 2005 and
subsequently plead guilty to the charges. Nixon's argument is that his then-counsel,
Clark, was "high" at the time he was giving advice to Nixon, which led to Nixon not
being fully advised as to the possibility of a self-defense claim (R.004).
The trial court found that Appellant's arguments did not meet the standard of
the "interest of justice" exception to the statute of limitations for a petition for postconviction relief (R.168). The court further found that the Appellant failed to allege
sufficient facts to support the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 168). The
lower court's findings did not take into consideration the ramifications of the
ineffective counsel that Nixon experienced, nor the ramifications of Nixon's
acceptance of a plea without full advice as to his potential defenses. The following
is a history and timeline of the post-conviction petitions/motions filed by Appellant:
1.

On May 11,2006, Appellant first filed a petition for writ of coram nobus,
in the Second Judicial District Court, County of Weber (R.096).

2.

On May 30,2006, the District Court Judge Pamela G. Heffernan denied
Nixon's petition for coram nobus, finding that an appropriate procedure
and avenue for Nixon's relief was through the Post Conviction
Remedies Act (R.106).

3.

On June 7, 2006, Nixon filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied on June 19, 2006 (R. 109, 114-115).

4.

On July 12, 2006, Nixon filed a motion for a change of venue to move
-6-

the proceedings from the Second Judicial District Court of the County
of Weber to the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, (the
county of his incarceration) (Addendum 3, p.9).
5.

On July 13, 2006, Nixon filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and
supporting memorandum in the Third Judicial District Court (R.008017).

6.

Nixon's motion for change of venue, in the Second District Court was
denied on September 5, 2006 (Addendum 3, p.9).

7.

On September 12,2006, Nixon filed a motion for reconsideration of his
motion for change of venue filed with the Second District Court, which
was subsequently denied on October 4, 2006 (Addendum 3, p.9).

8.

On September 26, 2006, the Third District Court ordered a transfer of
the petition filed on July 13, 2006 to the Second District Court, County
of Davis, State of Utah (R.018-023, 025-026).

9.

On May 3, 2007, the Second District Court, County of Davis, ordered
the case filings and pending motions be transferred to the Second
District Court, County of Weber (R.024).

10.

On May 11,2007, Appellant's previously filed petition for writ of habeas
corpus in Third District Court was transferred and filed with the Second
District Court, County of Weber.

Thus, as of May 11, 2007, the pending petition filed on July 13, 2006 with
-7-

Third District Court, and then transferred to Second District Court, County of Davis
on September 26, 2006, was finally filed with the Second District Court, County of
Davis, pursuant to a transfer order. On July 17, 2007, the State filed its motion to
dismiss, with supporting memorandum (R. 134-135). On September 14,2007, Nixon
filed his response to the State's motion to dismiss his petition for post-conviction
relief, with supporting memorandum (R.143-148). On October 25, 2007, the State
replied to Appellant's response to Nixon's petition for post-conviction relief (R.152161). On October 24, 2007, Nixon requested a hearing concerning the State's
motion to dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief (R.170-171). On October 22,
2007, without having any hearing on the matter, the trial court judge, the Honorable
Pamela G. Heffernan, granted the State's motion to dismiss Nixon's petition for postconviction relief (R.162-168). Within said order for dismissal, the trial court judge
found that Nixon's explanation for his untimely filing was considered "poor" (R.164).
The trial court found this despite the efforts made by the Appellant in filing multiple
petitions for relief over the previous year, as well as the motions to change venue
and the pending motions/petitions filed with Third District Court which were then
ordered transferred to Second District Court, Davis County and finally transferred,
still fully pending, to Second District Court, Weber County on May 3, 2007.
At the time Nixon discovered Clark's guilty pleas to the third degree felonies,
he immediately obtained a new attorney to help him (R.146). Upon an exhaustion
of all possible state remedies, including the petition for post-conviction relief, the
-8-

court still found that the Appellant did not take the necessary steps to obviate the
statute of limitations.
Clark's obvious use of drugs during his professional work resulted in Clark not
giving advice as constitutionally mandated to his client, Nixon. Nixon did not become
aware of Clark's errors regarding the availability of a self-defense claim and the
possibility that such a claim would be recognized by the court, until 2006. Such error
by Clark demonstrated that his performance, or lack thereof, prejudiced the
Appellant.
Based upon Clark's ineffective representation and advice, Nixon entered into
a plea agreement. Without hearing or argument the court below made a decision,
based upon the motion to dismiss from the State, to dismiss Appellant's Postconviction relief, finding that the Appellant's claim of ineffective counsel did not meet
the "interests of justice" exception to the statute of limitations.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The fundamental issue in this case is whether the trial court was correct in
dismissing Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief, despite his claim that he was
prejudiced by the ineffective counsel he received from Clark.

The trial court

incorrectly and erroneously found Appellant's allegations of ineffective counsel did
not meet the "interest of justice" exception of the Act, despite clear evidence that
Nixon's previous counsel, Clark, was high on drugs at the time he was counseling
the client, and never informed Nixon of a defense of self-defense, all resulting in
-9-

ineffective counsel. The trial court failed adequately to review the evidence before
it to obtain a clear picture as to the prejudice that is experienced by Nixon, due to the
actions of his previous counsel.
During the six months in which Clark represented Nixon in his case, Nixon was
only contacted by him three times.

Nixon paid out over $30,000.00 for

representation, but was only spoken with three times. Further, Nixon was never told
of the possibility of a defense of self-defense to the charges that were levied against
him by the State, nor was he adequately informed of any option to put forward a selfdefense claim.
Further, the court made it's decision to dismiss Nixon's petition for postconviction relief without ever giving him an evidentiary hearing, or even a law and
motion hearing to argue against the State's motion. Nixon never had a chance to
be heard by the court below as to the prejudice he is experiencing, due to his
previous counsel's ineffective representation and to present further evidence that a
self-defense claim could have impacted the result in the matter. Such denial of his
ability to argue before the trial court and the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief results in extreme injustice and denies Nixon his constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel, and ultimately to due process.
Utah case law is clear that a district court should analyze both the merits of
the claim for relief and the reason for an untimely filing when determining whether
or not to excuse an Appellant's untimely filing, under the post-conviction relief
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statute, found at U . C A §78-35(a)-107 (3). Johnson v. State, 2006 UT 21, Ifs 18 and
20. See also Adams v. Utah, 2005 UT 62, (holding that the "interests of justice"
exception should involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the Appellant's
underlying claim and the reason for an untimely filing.)
When the appellant in Adams claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, it was
based on his counsel's failure to argue a legitimate legal theory, combined with his
inability to find a post-conviction attorney, that lead to his untimely filing. Although
the trial court is uniquely situated to judge the matter before it on the weight of the
evidence, case law is clear an appellate court can overturn a trial court ruling if it is
clearly erroneous and without evidence to support it. Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT
53. Further, case law is clear that the appellate courts have the ability to review de
novo the trial court's findings about the "interest of justice" exception to the statute
of limitations. Adams v. State, 2005 UT App. 62.
In the instant case, the trial court erroneously found, despite clear evidence
before it, that Nixon did not make steps to timely file his petition. This finding is in
error. Appellant filed motions for relief upon his discovery of Clark's plea to drug
use, and subsequent disbarment, and the fact that Clark must have been impaired
while representing Nixon. Appellant filed a writ of coram nobus, a writ of habeas
corpus, in both Second District Court and Third District Court, a motion for
reconsideration, a motion for change of venue, and a "petition for post-conviction
relief." All such documents were reviewed and ultimately decided upon by the same
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judge. Appellant never failed to have a petition pending, for over a year in the trial
courts.
The court further erred in finding Appellant did not present adequate evidence
of Clark's ineffective assistance of counsel in plea negotiation and sentencing. The
trial court did not adequately review the evidence before it. First, Nixon was never
told by Clark of a defense of self-defense. He was unaware he could have made
such a claim until he spoke with his current counsel, almost 17 months after
sentencing. Such a defense could have had great influence on the outcome of his
case. Had he known of such defense, Appellant's decision to move forward and the
outcome of the case, could have been completely different.

The Appellant

presented evidence that his former wife had a history of violence. Such a defense
could impact the case.
Second, the evidence before the court was quite clear indicating that Clark,
at the time of Nixon's change of plea, and at the sentencing, was intoxicated on
illegal drugs.
These facts and circumstances were adequately alleged and briefed in all
petitions and writs and motions that were reviewed by the trial court. Despite all the
facts and circumstances alleged, the trial court erroneously made the order of
dismissal resulting in further prejudice to the Appellant.

-12-

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting State's Motion to Dismiss Appellants
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief When Finding Said Petition Was
Untimely.
U.C.A. §78-35(a)-107(3) states: "That if a court finds that if the interest of

justice require, a court may excuse a Appellant's untimely filing. . ." Johnson v.
State, 2006 UT 21,1J18. The reason behind such provision is to ensure that, if an
individual is inadequately represented by counsel, he has the opportunity to remedy
the denial of due process and not be chained to bright line rules.
As governed by U.C.A. §78-35(a)-107, an individual can file a petition for postconviction relief within one year after the cause of action has accrued; however, if
he can show that he was prejudiced and allege sufficient facts to support his
untimely filing, any individual can still have a sentence reviewed or a new trial
granted. In the instant case, Appellant was sentenced on September 2, 2004, to 0
to 5 years at the Utah State Prison. On June 30,2005, the Appellant's then counsel,
Jeffery Clark, entered a plea of guilty to two third degree felonies, which included the
possession of a controlled substance and the attempt to distribute a controlled
substance. Appellant, in prison, did not learn of this right away. As soon as the
Appellant had knowledge of the activities of his former counsel, he realized this
could have seriously impaired Clark's ability to provide effective counsel and thus
impacted Appellant's guilty plea. Nixon was never told by Clark, nor by his other
attorney, Christopher Greenwood, who was working with Clark, as to the ability to
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claim a defense of self-defense to attempted murder or assault. He did not discover
this avenue of defense until speaking with his current attorney.

As soon as

Appellant realized that he was prejudiced by not having effective counsel at the time
of his plea, he judiciously sought counsel.
The Appellant filed a writ of coram nobus with the trial court, noting Appellant's
previous counsel, Clark, was ineffective on May 11, 2006. Within Appellants writ of
coram nobus, the Appellant argued that Clark failed to provide effective assistance
of counsel to him, in that he only contacted him three times in six months, never
answered his phone or returned the Appellant's phone calls, failed to inform the
Appellant about an available defense, and at the time of Appellant's decision to
plead, and at plea and sentencing, Clark was high on illegal drugs and unable to
appreciate the proceedings. The Appellant further filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus on May 12,2007, stating similar circumstances, further indicating to the court
that, since the Appellant had entered his plea, Clark had plead guilty to two third
degree felonies, as well as having his Bar license placed on interim suspension.
The trial court did not treat these as petitions for post-conviction relief. Both of these
petitions were denied by the trial court, with a note from the trial court indicating that
the appropriate procedure for the Appellant was to file a petition under the Post
Conviction Remedies Act. Appellant understood that he was already outside the
one-year time parameters of the Post Conviction Remedies Act, so he filed a motion
for reconsideration on June 7, 2006. This motion was denied by the trial court.

- 14-

Appellant then filed a motion for a change of venue, on July 12, 2006, so as to join
his petition in the Third District, which again was denied by the trial court.

On or

about the same time, Appellant filed a petition with the Third District Court.
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration for his motion for change of venue on
September 12, 2006 with the Second District Court, which was denied on October
4, 2006.

On September 26, 2006, the Third District Court ordered that case

transferred to Second Judicial District Court, County of Davis. The case stayed in
Davis County for months.
On May 9, 2007, the Second Judicial District Court, County of Davis
transferred files, records and pending motions to Second District Court, County of
Weber, for trial pursuant to the order of the court on May 3, 2007 (see Addendum
6). Appellant also filed another petition for post-conviction relief on May 11, 2007.
These actions provide clear evidence that Appellant was acting in a judicious
manner. However, the trial court inappropriately found Appellant's explanation for
untimely filing could be considered "poor." To say so, the trial court is essentially
saying that, although an Appellant did not know of the basis of his petition (Clark's
drug use) until after one year had passed, then worked on various avenues of relief
and tried to exhaust all avenues, he did not act timely. The trial court, in making this
finding, ignored all the evidence of Nixon's efforts before it. Such a finding is
erroneous. This finding denies Nixon of his right of due process. In the interest of
justice and fairness, the trial court's grant of the State's motion to dismiss should be
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overturned and the petition remanded for hearing on the merits.
II.

The Trial Court Erred in its Findings That the Interest of Justice
Exception to the Statute of Limitations for Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief Did Not Apply.
A court may excuse an Appellant's untimely filing if it finds that the interest of

justice require it. In evaluating whether or not the interest of justice grant an excuse
to untimely filing, a district court should analyze both the merits for the claim for relief
and the reasons for the untimely filing. Johnson v. State, 2006 UT 21, fls 18, 20.
The appellant in Adams filed a petition for post-conviction relief after the one year
statute of limitations provided for within the Act had expired. The government
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Adams as time barred under
the statute of limitations. Similar to the instant case, the district court in Adams
rejected that appellant's claim that the "interest of justice exception" to the Post
Conviction Remedies Act applied. The appellant in Adams argued that the interest
of justice exception applied and that he had "brought the non-frivolous claim with
good reason for filing late, in that it was not known that he might assert the defense
of voluntary intoxication either at trial or on appeal, and only became aware of the
possibility after obtaining counsel for these proceedings." Adams at fl13. The
district court in Adams agreed with the government, that the interest of justice
exception should only apply in truly extraordinary circumstances beyond a parties'
control.
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed with this analysis, and explained what is
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meant by the "interest of justice" exception. In defining what the "interest of justice"
exception means, the Court in Adams stated that an exception should involve
examination of both the mehtoriousness of an appellant's claim and the reasons for
the untimely filing. The Court further found that it could not establish as a hard and
fast rule that an appellant must be able to demonstrate both that his claim is
meritorious and that he was justified in raising it late. Rather, the Court required the
district court to give appropriate weight to each of the factors according to the
circumstances of the particular case.
In Adams the Supreme Court found that appellant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on his counsel's failure to argue a legitimate theory,
combined with his inability to find a post-conviction attorney that lead to the untimely
filing, warranted reinstating the petition and allowing the appellant the opportunity to
present his claim at a hearing. Likewise, the statute of limitations in the instant case
should not have precluded the Appellant from a hearing regarding his petition for
post-conviction relief. The Appellant has both a meritorious claim and reason for his
untimely filing.
First, like the appellant in Adams, the Appellant in the instant case made a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as the basis for seeking relief.
Specifically, Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel from both Clark,
who was the lead attorney in the case, and from Christopher Greenwood, who was
involved in a more limited role than Clark.

-17-

Clark demonstrated general gross

incompetency when he plead to his drug charges, resulting in his disbarment. These
activities in and of themselves show ineffective assistance of counsel under the
totality of the circumstances. Further, the Appellant asserts that, when Clark was
representing him at a sentencing, Clark was under the influence of drugs. Most
egregiously, and for the same reason the Supreme Court found to be meritorious in
Adams. Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorneys
never discussed with him a possibility of a self-defense claim to the crime for which
he was charged.
The appellant in Adams was convicted of forcible sexual abuse, which
contains two elements of intent. The Adams appellant alleged that he "was drunk
to the point of losing the ability to comprehend his circumstances, identity, and all
memory of events in his inebriated state." ]d, at fl22. The Supreme Court
determined that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was meritorious based
on the ability the Adams appellant would have had to assert such a defense.
Similarly, in the instant case, Appellant was charged with attempted murder and later
entered a plea of guilty to aggravated assault. U.C.A. §78-2-402, identifies selfdefense as a justification for "threatening or using force against another when and
to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend
himself." The Appellant's former wife had a history of domestic violence. However,
Clark never apprised the Appellant of the possibility of asserting the defense of selfdefense to the attempted murder charge. Had Appellant been apprised of such a
-18-

possibility, it could ultimately have changed the outcome of the case. Appellant only
became aware of this possibility upon consulting with his current counsel. The
failure of Clark to inform Appellant of the availability of this defense to his charges
independently, combined with prior counsel's other actions, such as advising his
clients while under the influence of controlled substances and being convicted of
possession and use of controlled substances, constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel as described by Adams.
Under Strictland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), an ineffective
assistance claim must pass a two prong test; 1) counsel's performance must be
deficient below an objective standard or reasonableness, and 2) counsel's deficient
performance must prejudice his client, id. at 687. In determining whether the
appellant alleged the appropriate facts, the trial court found that he failed to allege
any thing that would entitle him to a defense. This is not accurate. The Appellant
specifically indicated to the court below that his former wife had a history of violence.
The trial court found that the Appellant gave no details of this "history of violence.''
However, the Supreme Court found that the Adams appellant was uninformed that
he could assert the defense of voluntary intoxication, either at trial or on appeal,
based upon a statement by that appellant that he, "was drunk to the point of losing
the ability to comprehend his circumstances, identity, and all memory of events in
his inebriated state." The Court found that Mr. Adams met the requirement. So
does Nixon, here.
-19-

Similar to the Adams case, Appellant here was never told of a defense of selfdefense. This is founded upon his statements within his pleadings indicating that
there was a history of abuse and violence within his marriage. Moreover, the court
below made its decision without ever granting a hearing in accordance with the Post
Conviction Remedies Act to allow the Appellant to put evidence before the trial court
to show the validity of his claims.
The trial court's finding that the Appellant's petition and subsequent pleadings
did not meet the interest of justice exception to the statute of limitations for postconviction relief puts the Appellant at distinct disadvantage. It essentially eviscerates
his due process rights. Not only was the Appellant denied his right to effective
counsel due to his prior counsel's drug use and egregious oversight about the selfdefense issue; but he was denied his constitutional right to habeas corpus. Once
he filed his first petition, he went forward timely with his post-conviction claims.
The Appellant was never allowed a hearing on any of his petitions. This was
error.
Based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel he had at his plea and
sentencing, the Appellant spent years in prison. The Appellant now faces the
potential of having difficulty in finding employment and faces further continuing
deprivation of his civil rights. Appellant's due process rights were violated at plea
negotiation, plea and sentencing. Appellant's due process rights were violated when
the court below denied all post-conviction claims for relief. Appellant's due process
-20-

rights will continue to be violated, due to the ongoing ramifications of his guilty plea
to aggravated assault, based on ineffective counsel. This Court should rectify this
violation of Appellant's rights and reverse the trial court's dismissal of the action and
remand this case for evidentiary hearing on the merits.
III.

The Trial Court Erred in its Finding That Appellant Did Not Allege
Sufficient Facts to Support His Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in a guilty plea case,

Appellant must establish, "[t]hat there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's error, he would not have plead guilty and would have insisted of going to
trial." Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066,1072 (10th Cir. 2001). It is not necessary
for the Appellant to show that he actually would have prevailed at trial. The Court
can consider the strength of the government's case against the Appellant, in
evaluating whether Appellant really would have gone to trial if he had received
adequate advice from counsel. However, that is not determinative. Miller, 262 F.3d
at 1069. In determining whether or not the Appellant would have insisted on trial, but
for his trial counsel's errors, the court should look to the circumstances surrounding
the plea to determine whether [he] would have proceeded to trial.

U.S.A. v.

Cleaman, 288 F.2d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Further, the actual prejudice against the Appellant should have been weighed
against the totality of the evidence before the trier of fact. Strictland, at 695. This
determination as to whether Appellant met the prejudice prong of Strictland, should
-21 -

have included consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the underlying
criminal case, including whether the Appellant had confessed, or given a statement
to the police, whether the plea offer was to a reduced charge, the strength of the
State's case, and the likelihood of conviction on a greater charge if the Appellant had
gone to trial.
Although the Appellant may have received a benefit for his plea, there is no
information indicating that the Appellant confessed. There is no indication that the
State had a strong case. Moreover, Appellant alleges that the strength of the State's
case would have been compromised by the fact that there had been a history of
violence against the Appellant by his former wife, which would have shown that
Appellant's former wife was the aggressor. In addition, there was evidence before
the lower court that, at the time of the plea, Nixon's prior counsel, Clark, was high
on illegal drugs.
The Appellant specifically indicated, in his memorandum in support of petition
for writ of coram nobus, filed on May 11, 2006, that although he paid his prior
counsel $30,000.00 to represent him in the felony case, Clark failed to provide
effective assistance of counsel in that he only met with Nixon three times in six
months, never answered his telephone calls, nor returned Appellant's phone calls;
failed to inform the Appellant about an available defense; and, at the time of
Appellant's decision to plead, plea and sentencing, Clark was high on illegal drugs
and unable to appreciate the ongoing proceeding. Based upon these allegations,
-22-

it is clear that Clark's performance was deficient below any objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that the first prong of Strictland
is an easy requirement to meet and is essentially meaningless; Parsons v. Barnes,
871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994). Clark made several errors that fall below the
standard of reasonable professional judgment. First, Clark did not inform Appellant
of the defense of self-defense available to the Appellant. Self-defense is a basic
defense claim that the reasonable attorney would explore in any criminal assault or
attempted murder proceeding. The fact that the Appellant did not set forth specific
facts that would have shown the self-defense claim, does not mean that he failed to
allege sufficient facts to support his petition. The fact that he was not even given the
chance of exploring the claim of self-defense, in and of itself, falls below the
reasonable professional standard of judgment for a defense attorney.
Secondly, Clark failed to communicate with Appellant in a manner that would
allow Appellant to participate in his case. Rule 1.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct state in relevant part, as follows: "(b) a lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation." In a six month period, Clark spoke with Appellant only
three times, despite Appellant's attempts to contact Clark. Three contacts in six
months may be reasonable amount of communication in some cases where issues
are dormant, but not in a criminal case moving forward to a plea.
-23-

Moreover, Clark's failure to contact Appellant and to reasonably explain to him
the availability of a self-defense claim violates the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Thus, Clark's violation of the Rules were sufficiently alleged to support Appellant's
claim of the first prong of Strictland.
Clark was high on illegal drugs at the time of Appellant's decision to plead,
entry of plea, and sentencing. Thus, he was in no condition to appreciate what was
happening during the sentencing and could not effectively assist Appellant in
understanding the proceeding. As stated above, Clark was later arrested and found
guilty for possession of methamphetamine and has had his Bar license suspended.
These actions specifically show Clark's conduct falling well below the
standards of reasonable professional judgment, thus meeting the first prong of the
Strictland test. Such allegations were alleged in the record in the trial court, as well
as within all the petitions for post-conviction relief. In order to satisfy the second
requirement that Clark's performance, or lack thereof, prejudiced the Appellant, "the
Appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors the results of the proceeding would have been different."
Strictland. 466 U.S. at 694. In State v. Martinez, 26 P.3d 203, 207 (Utah 2001), the
Court specifically addressed this requirement in the context of a guilty plea, writing,
"Appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." i d
It is clear from the pleadings of the Appellant, that the Appellant did not
-24-

become aware of Clark's error/omission regarding the availability of a self-defense
claim until after he had plead guilty to the charges, over a year had passed and he
retained new counsel. The availability of this defense and the probability such a
claim could be recognized by a court and accepted by a jury, demonstrates that
Clark's performance actually prejudiced his client.
Further, Clark's drug use and incoherence at Appellant's sentencing hearing
constitutes a violation of the Appellant's constitutional rights to effective assistance
of counsel provided for by the Utah Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. Had the
Appellant known about the ability to present a self-defense claim, he likely would
have insisted on going to trial. There are sufficient facts alleged by the Appellant in
all of the record below which indicate that the history of violence by his former wife
would have been a basis for a self-defense claim.
The trial court's disregard for the facts that were before it prejudices the
Appellant even further. Due to the dismissal of the post-conviction relief petitions,
the Appellant had to remain in prison for a crime that he could have defended.
Moreover, the ramifications of said plea specifically prejudiced the Appellant. The
actions of the trial court in dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief and not
allowing an evidentiary hearing on said petition, violates the Appellant's due process
rights and has prejudiced him in numerous ways.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully requests this Court to
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reverse the trial court's order of dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, and
to remand the matter for further proceedings.
DATED this

day of March 2008.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, PC

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Appellant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of
the foregoing to the following:
ERIN RILEY
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
P.O. BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854

on this

day of March 2008.

Secretary
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT^OURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CALVIN LEE NIXON,

RULING GRANTING
STATE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

QQJ * f 200Z

Respondent.

Case No. 070903073
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan

Petitioner Calvin Lee Nixon filed a petition for post-conviction relief on May 11,
2007, under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101
et seq. Respondent State of Utah moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to rules 12(b)(6)
and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner then filed a response to the
motion, and Respondent filed a reply. After considering the petition and the memoranda
filed by both parties, the Court grants the State's motion to dismiss the petition.
In his petition for relief, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a new trial based
on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner claims that his counsel, Geoffrey
Clark, failed to discuss the possibility of a self-defense claim with his client, never
answered his phone, and only met with Petitioner three times. Further, Petitioner claims
his counsel "was likely to be high on drugs at the time of Petitioner's plea and
settlement." Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, p. 4.
I. The "Interests of Justice" Exception
The State argues that the petition should be dismissed because it is untimely.
Petitioner was originally charged with one count of attempted murder in an incident
Ruling Granting State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for
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involving his former wife, but later pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a thirddegree felony. He was sentenced on September 2, 2004, to 0 to 5 years in the Utah State
Prison, but did not file his petition for post-conviction relief until May 11, 2007. The
PCRA states that a petition must be "filed within one year after the cause of action has
accrued." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l). Petitioner does not challenge that the
petition is untimely, but rather submits that the petition meets the "interests of justice"
exception of the PCRA, which allows the Court to excuse an untimely filing "[i]f the
court finds that the interests of justice require." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3).
In Adams v. State, 123 P.3d 400 (Utah 2005), the Utah Supreme Court analyzed
the "interests of justice" exception, declaring that it:
[S]hould involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the petitioner's claim
and the reason for an untimely filing. We do not establish as a hard and fast rule
that a petitioner must be able to demonstrate both that his claim is meritorious and
that he was justified in raising it late; rather we expect that the district court will
give appropriate weight to each of those factors according to the circumstances of
a particular case.
Id. at 404. In analyzing these two factors, "the court should rely not only on the
petitioner's memorandum in opposition but also on the initial petition itself in evaluating
the two factors we have identified." Id. If a petitioner's claims fail to meet the interests
of justice standard as set out in Adams, an untimely petition may rightly be dismissed.
See id. at 401, 405.
A. Reason for Untimely Filing
With these points in mind, the Court will first examine Petitioner's reason for the
untimely filing. Petitioner's sole explanation for filing his petition more than 32 months
after his sentencing is limited to his assertion that he "did not become aware of the
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availability of a self-defense claim until consulting with his current counsel." Response
to State's Motion to Dismiss..., p. 5.
While the Court accepts that this explanation with regards to the self-defense
claim is a plausible reason for delay, it should be noted that Petitioner raised the very
same claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis
filed on May 16, 2006, almost one year prior to his May 11, 2007, petition for postconviction relief. Additionally, this Court denied the Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis
on May 30, 2006, on the grounds that the appropriate procedure for claims such as
Petitioner's was post-conviction relief; yet Petitioner does not explain the 11-month delay
from that date in filing his petition. Furthermore, Petitioner provides no explanation as to
why he did not previously raise his claims regarding his counsel's alleged drug use and
supposed failure to attend to his client.
At best, Petitioner's explanation for the untimely filing could be considered
"poor." Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a conclusively meritorious
claim "may require virtually no justification for a late filing." Adams, 123 P.3d at 404.
Therefore, the Court grants Petitioner the benefit of the doubt and considers the
meritoriousness of his claims.
B. Meritoriousness of Petitioner's Claims
In examining claims under the "interests of justice" exception, the Court "must go
one step further" than whether a claim is non-frivolous "and examine whether the claim
is meritorious. The petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient factual evidence
or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness." Id. at 405. Ultimately, in

Ruling Granting State's Mouon to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Reliei
No. 070903073
Page 4 of 8

this case, it is the Petitioner's utter lack of factual evidence to support his claims which
dooms his petition.
Petitioner's plea for relief is based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), ineffective assistance claims must pass a
two-prong test: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient below an objective standard
of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance must prejudice his client. Id.
at 687. Therefore, the Court will examine these two prongs in order to determine if
Petitioner's claims are meritorious.
1. Deficient Performance
a. Failure to Raise Self-defense Claim
Petitioner alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to discuss with him the possibility of a self-defense claim. Under
Strickland, there is a strong presumption that counsel performed adequately. Id. at 690.
In order for Petitioner to overcome this presumption, he must allege facts which show
that he may have had a valid self-defense claim, and that his attorney failed to recognize
that claim from the stated facts. However, Petitioner fails to allege any facts which
would suggest he was entitled to a claim of self-defense. In fact, Petitioner does not even
allege that he did act in self-defense; he merely states that his attorney did not discuss a
self-defense claim with him.
Petitioner's only attempt at providing factual support for a possible self-defense
claim comes in his statement that "Petitioner and his former wife have a history of
violence, but the Petitioner was never apprised of the possibility of exerting the defense
of self-defense on the attempted murder charge by his former counsel." Response to
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State's Motion to Dismiss..., p. 4. Petitioner gives no details of this "history of violence"
and does not allege that his former wife had ever been violent towards him. More
importantly, he does not allege that she was violent towards him during the incident
which led to him being charged with attempted murder. Without providing some sort of
factual basis for a self-defense claim, Petitioner cannot show that his counsel was
deficient in not raising such a claim.
b. Drug Use
Petitioner also alleges that his attorney was "likely to be high on drugs" at the
time of his plea and sentencing. This allegation appears to be mere speculation based on
the fact that Petitioner's former counsel was later convicted of drug charges and had his
bar license suspended. Petitioner fails to allege any specific facts which would show that
his attorney was on drugs at the time of his plea or sentencing.
Further, even if Petitioner could show that his attorney was on drugs, drug use by
itself is irrelevant to a claim of ineffective assistance. See Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451,
454 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Mont. 1990). "The critical
inquiry is whether, for whatever reason, counsel's performance was deficient and
whether that deficiency prejudiced the defendant." Berry, 765 F.2d at 454. Petitioner
makes no claims as to how his counsel's supposed drug use affected his performance. He
does not even allege that his counsel acted strangely, or that he had any reason
whatsoever to believe he might be on drugs. As such, Petitioner's bald allegation is
insufficient to show that his counsel's performance was deficient.
c. Other factors
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Petitioner also asserts that his attorney did not take his phone calls and only met
with him three times in six months. These allegations provide no insight into the
effectiveness of counsel's representation of the Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner has
failed to carry his burden of showing that his counsel's performance was deficient.
2. Prejudice to Client
Not only has Petitioner failed to show that his counsel's performance was
deficient, but he has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by the performance. In
order to show prejudice, Petitioner must show that there would be a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 695.
Petitioner has argued that he was prejudiced because his attorney never discussed
with him the possibility of a self-defense claim. While the outcome may have been more
favorable for Petitioner if he had a valid self-defense claim, Petitioner makes no
assertions and provides no facts which would support such a claim. Without facts on
which to determine the possible validity of the self-defense claim, the Court cannot find
that Petitioner may have been prejudiced by the failure to raise the claim.
Additionally, Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged
drug use during the plea and sentencing. But Petitioner does not specify how his
counsel's drug use affected his performance or prejudiced the outcome of his case.
Therefore, the Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged
drug use.
Finally, the Court also notes that Petitioner was originally charged with attempted
murder. But as the result of his plea, he was only convicted of aggravated assault, a
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third-degree felony. Petitioner has provided no justifiable reason in his petition or
memoranda for him to have gone to trial on the attempted murder charge, rather than
plead guilty to the third-degree felony. He clearly received a benefit in the form of a
lighter sentence by pleading guilty to the reduced charge than he would have if convicted
of attempted murder. Petitioner has failed to show any prejudice resulting from his
counsel's performance.
Conclusion
Petitioner has not alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel which would prevent the dismissal of the petition. From his claims
stated, he cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance, nor can he
show that his counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard of
reasonableness. As such, he cannot meet the two-prong test of Strickland. Petitioner's
claims lack merit under the standard described in Adams. Further, Petitioner has
provided an inadequate explanation for his delay in filing. The petition for postconviction relief does not meet the "interests of justice" exception, and is therefore
untimely under the PCRA.
Accordingly, the Court grants the State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for PostConviction Relief. Ms. Riley will please prepare the appropjkfeord^jr.
Dated this J^Adayof October, 2007.

Pamela G. Heff(^rnaii,^^ge
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. CALVIN LEE JR NIXON
CASE NUMBER 041901203 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-103 - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 2nd Degree Felony
(amended) to 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: August 31, 2 004 Guilty
Disposition: August 31, 2004 Guilty

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
PARTIES
Defendant - CALVIN LEE JR NIXON
Represented by: GEOFFREY L CLARK
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH
Represented by: BRANDON J MAYNARD
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: CALVIN LEE JR NIXON
Offense tracking number: 146123 86
Date of Birth: April 30, 1960
Law Enforcement Agency: ROY CITY POLICE
Prosecuting Agency: WEBER COUNTY
Violation Date: March 04, 2004 WEBER COUNTY
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due
Amount Paid
Credit
Balance

5.00
5.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES
Amount Due:
5.00
Amount Paid:
5.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
CASE NOTE
WCJ ($10,000 BAIL)
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CASE NUMBER 041901203 State Felony

PROCEEDINGS
01-01-00
03-05-04
03-05-04
03-05-04
03-05-04
03-05-04

Charge 1 Disposition removed.
Judge JONES assigned.
Judge HEFFERNAN assigned.
Case filed
Filed: Information
DECISION TO PRELIM scheduled on March 09, 2 004 at 02:00 PM in
3rd Floor Southeast with Judge HEFFERNAN.
03-05-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance
Judge:
W. BRENT WEST
PRESENT
Clerk:
azured
Prosecutor: RICHARD PARMLEY
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROY COLE, PDA
Audio
Tape Number:

V04-23

Tape Count: 5165

INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
The Information is read.
Advised of charges and penalties.
The defendant is advised of right to counsel.
Defendant is arraigned.
Matter is set for decision to preliminary hearing 03-09-2004 at
2:00 p.m. before Judge Heffernan. Court orders defendant to have no
contact with T. Cobbs. The Court sets bail at $10,000.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints PDA STATE to
represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name: PDA STATE
Address: 2562 WASHINGTON BLVD
City: OGDEN UT 844 01
Phone:
DECISION TO PRELIM is scheduled.
Date: 03/09/2004
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southeast
Second District Court
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CASE NUMBER 041901203 State Felony

2 525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
03-08-04 Note: DECISION TO PRELIM calendar modified.
03-09-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for DECISION TO PRELIM
Judge:
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: BRENDA BEATON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GEOFFREY CLARK
KRISTOPHER GREENWOOD
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
Video
Tape Number:

H030904

Tape Count: 217

HEARING
This is the time set for decision to prelim. Defendant is present
in custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by
Geoffrey Clark and Kristopher Greenwood. Mr. Clark moves for
preliminary hearing.
State concurs. Court grants. Preliminary hearing is set 3/26/04 at
10:00 a.m. Bail remains set at $10,000.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 03/26/2004
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southeast
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
03-09-04 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on March 26, 2004 at 10:00 AM in
3rd Floor Southeast with Judge HEFFERNAN.
03-11-04 Filed: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL, KRISTOPHER K GREENWOOD
03-11-04 Filed: DISCOVERY REQUEST
03-26-04 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on May 04, 2004 at 02:00 PM in
3rd Floor Southeast with Judge HEFFERNAN.
03-26-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRELIM WAIVER, ARRAIGNMENT
Judge:
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
PRESENT

Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: MAYNARD, BRANDON J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GREENWOOD, KRISTOPHER K
Video
Tape Number:

H032604
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CASE NUMBER 041901203 State Felony

HEARING
This is the time set for preliminary hearing. Hearing not held.
Defendant is present in custody from the Weber County Jail.
Defendant is represented by Kristopher Greenwood.
The defendant requests the right to waive preliminary hearing.
State concurs. Court grants the waiver and orders the defendant
bound over for trial.
ARRAIGNMENT
The Information is read.
Advised of rights and penalties.
Defendant is arraigned.
The Court advises defendant of his right to a speedy trial.
Defendant waives that right. Mr. Greenwood moves to set this matter
for a pre-trial. State concurs. Court grants. Pre-trial is set
5/4/04 at 2:00 p.m. Bail remains set at $10,000.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 05/04/2004
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southeast
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Qgden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
04-07-04 Filed: VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT
05-04-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
Judge:
PAMELA. G. HEFFERNAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: MAYNARD, BRANDON J
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, GEOFFREY
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole

Video
Tape Number:

H050404

Tape Count: 527

HEARING
This is the time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is in
custody but not present in court. Defendant is represented by
Geoffrey Clark. Mr. Clark moves to set this matter for plea. State
concurs. Court grants.
Plea is set 5/11/04 at 10:00 a.m. Bail remains set at $10,000.
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PLEA is scheduled.
Date: 05/11/2004
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southeast
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
05-05-04 PLEA scheduled on May 11, 2004 at 10:00 AM in 3rd Floor
Southeast with Judge HEFFERNAN.
05-11-04 Filed order: Statement of defendant in support of guilty plea
and certificate of counsel and Order
Judge pheffern
Signed May 11, 2004
05-11-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for PLEA
Judge:
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: BRANDON J MAYNARD
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GEOFFREY CLARK
KRISTOPHER K GREENWOOD
Video
Tape Number:

HO51104

Tape Count: 100 8

HEARING
This is the time set for plea. Defendant is present in custody
from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by Geoffrey
Clark and Kristopher Greenwood.
As part of plea negotiations, the State agrees to one year in jail
with credit for time served. The State will not oppose 402 B
treatment if eligible. The State will recommend no good time at the
time of sentencing.
The Court agrees that the defendant may be allowed to withdraw his
plea at the time of sentencing if the Court does not agree with the
recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole.
The State files an amended information in open court charging
defendant with aggravated robbery a second degree felony.
The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a full Rule 11
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court.
The Court advises defendant of rights. Defendant enters a plea of
guilty to the charge as amended.
The Court accepts plea, finds that it is knowingly and voluntarily
given and there is a factual basis for the charge. The Court
requests a pre-sentence report.
Sentencing is set 6/15/04 at 2:00 p.m. Court orders bail revoked.
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APP SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 06/15/2004
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southeast
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
05-11-04 Charge 1 amended
05-11-04 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty
05-11-04 APP SENTENCING scheduled on June 15, 2004 at 02:00 PM in 3rd
Floor Southeast with Judge HEFFERNAN.
06-09-04 Filed: AP&P PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
06-15-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP SENTENCING
Judge:
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: MAYNARD, BRANDON J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GREENWOOD, KRISTOPHER K
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
Tape Number:

H061504

Tape Count: 347

HEARING
This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in
custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by
Kristopher Greenwood. The Court hears from the victim.
The Court advises all parties that prison is the intended
sentence. Based upon previous negotiations, Mr. Greenwood moves to
withdraw defendant's plea. State does not object. Court grants.
The State moves to withdraw the amended affidavit. Court grants.
The charge of attempted murder a second degree felony is
reinstated. Mr. Greenwood moves for trial setting. State concurs.
Court grants.
Jury trial is set 9/16/04 and 9/17/04 at 9:00 a.m. with a final
pre-trial set 8/31/04 at 2:00 p.m. The Court sets bail in the
amount of $10,000. Defendant is advised the "no contact" order is
still in effect.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 08/31/2004
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southeast
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
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JURY TRIAL.
Date: 09/16/2004
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southeast
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 844 01
Before Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 09/17/2004
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: 3rd Floor Southeast
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
06-16-04 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on August 31, 2004 at 02:00 PM
in 3rd Floor Southeast with Judge HEFFERNAN.
06-16-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on September 16, 2004 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southeast with Judge HEFFERNAN.
06-16-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on September 17, 2004 at 09:00 AM in 3rd
Floor Southeast with Judge HEFFERNAN.
08-19-04 Note: REC'D MOTION FOR RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 16(C)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - SENT TO PGH
08-20-04 Filed order: Motion for reciprocal discovery under Rule 16(c)
Memorandum and Order
Judge pheffern
Signed August 20, 2 004
08-31-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
Judge:
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: MAYNARD, BRANDON J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, GEOFFREY L
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
Video
Tape Number:

HO83104

Tape Count: 242

HEARING
This is the time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is
present in custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is
represented by Geoffrey Clark. Mr. Clark reports negotiations have
been reached.
The State files an amended information in open court. Charge is
amended from attempted murder a second degree felony to aggravated
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The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a full Rule 11
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court.
The Court advises defendant of rights. Defendant enters a plea of
guilty to the charge as amended.
The Court accepts plea, finds that it is knowingly and voluntarily
given and there is a factual basis for the charge. Parties
stipulate to proceed with sentencing today.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends defendant receive credit for time served while
at the Weber County Jail. The Court orders defendant to pay
restitution in the amount of $57.00 to the victim Tammy Cobb.

08-31-04 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty
09-01-04 Filed order: Statement of defendant in support of guilty plea
and certificate of counsel and Order
Judge pheffern
Signed August 31, 2 004
09-01-04 Filed: Amended Information
09-01-04 Charge 1 amended
09-01-04 JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
Reason: Settlement negotiations
09-02-04 Filed order: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
Judge ejones
Signed September 02, 2004
09-02-04 Note: Faxed copy of judgment and commitment to the Weber County
Jail and the Utah State Prison.
04-28-05 Filed: Withdrawal Of Counsel by Kristopher K Greenwood ATD
05-16-06 Filed: Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis
05-16-06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Petition for Writ
of Coram Nobis
05-16-06 Filed: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
05-22-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
5.00
05-22-06 POSTAGE-COPIES
Payment Received:
5.00

Printed: 07/05/07 13:36:26

Page 8

CASE NUMBER 041901203 State Felony

Note: POSTAGE-COPIES
05-22-06 Filed: Amended Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Petition

Fage y 01 IU

for Writ of Coram Nobis
05-22-06 Filed: Affidavit of Defendant in Support of Petition for Writ
Habeas Corpus
06-01-06 Filed order: Decision (Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis is
denied)
Judge pheffern
Signed May 30, 2 0 06
06-08-06 Filed: Motion for Reconsideration
06-19-06 Filed order: Decision (Motion for Reconsideration is denied)
Judge pheffern
Signed June 19, 2006
07-13-06 Filed: Motion for Change of Venue
08-22-06 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision
08-24-06 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Oct 23,
2006.
08-24-06 Filed: State's Response to Defendant's Request to Submit for
Decision
09-07-06 Filed order: Decision (Motion for Change of Venue is denied)
Judge pheffern
Signed September 05, 2 006
09-11-06 Tracking ended for Under advisement.
09-13-06 Filed: Motion for Reconsideration of Change of Venue
(Certificate of Mailing dated 9/12/06)
09-13-06 Note: HOLD UNTIL 9/29/06
10-02-06 Note: Clerk spoke with Atty Corporon's assistant Taune
requesting a Notice to Submit (on Motion for Reconsideration of
Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue.)
10-03-06 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision
10-03-06 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Dec 02,
2006.
10-03-06 Note: File to PGH for decision on Motion for Reconsideration of
Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue
10-06-06 Filed order: Decision (Motion for Reconsideration is denied)
Judge pheffern
Signed October 04, 2006
11-20-06 Tracking ended for Under advisement.
06-08-07 Filed: MOTION FOR RELEASE OF RECORD AND TRANSCRIPTS
Filed by: STATE OF UTAH,
06-08-07 Note: REC'D ORDER RELEASING RECORD AND TRANSCRIPTS
06-11-07 Tracking started for Motion. Review date Aug 10, 2007.
06-12-07 Note: ORDER RELEASING RECORD AND TRANSCRIPTS SENT UP TO PGH
WITH FILE FOR SIGNATURE
06-13-07 Tracking ended for Motion.
06-13-07 Filed order: Order releasing record and transcripts
Judge pheffern
Signed June 13, 2007
06-13-07 Note: File and Order forwarded to supervisor.

Printed: 07/05/07 13:36:26

Page 9

CASE NUMBER 0419012 03 State Felony

06-25-07 Filed: Certificate of Transfer of Record and Transcripts
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